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It is not possible to go into particular departments of the university course of study and erect as it were the whole edifice from the foundation stone, without at the same time following the branches of science itself and constructing from them the organic whole.

I shall accordingly be obliged next to present the inter-connection of all sciences among themselves and the objectivity which this internal organic unity has received from the external organization of universities.

In a measure this outline might take the place of a general encyclopædia of science, but as I never consider these purely in themselves, but always in special relation to my lecture, a system of knowledge derived in the strictest manner from the highest principles cannot be expected. In these lectures I cannot exhaust my subject. This can be done only in actual construction and demonstration. I shall leave unsaid much which perhaps deserves to be said, but on the other hand I shall avoid saying anything which were better unsaid, either on its own account or because of the time and the present condition of science.

DOGMATIC PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

Translated from the German of Karl Friedrich Goeschel, by T. R. VICKROY.

It may be presumed as known that the three intellectual proofs for the existence of God, with which philosophy has so long busied itself, have but recently been proved in their necessary unfoldings and scientific statement. Better known is the relation between *being* and *thought*, from which these proofs are unfolded, or from whose unfoldings they proceed, since, in the first place, out of this outer, objective, substantial existence of the world, a deduction is made of the creative thoughts as a ground underlying this existence, which creative thought shows itself as the power and wisdom manifest in being, and hence as the absolute

being, and then conversely deduces the existence of God in his absolute perfection from his subjective thought or idea of God.

The proofs for the existence of God are, in the first place, transitions from what is most immediate to what is most remote: they are means of elevation to God, or guides which from various sides point toward the goal. They may therefore differ as widely as the points of departure vary. So far these ways and means of elevation to God are infinite in number. But as surely as they all belong to being and thought, so surely must there be a law dwelling in them. They are reducible to a three-fold determination, but first of all to a two-fold determination, because they progress and rise either from objective existence to absolute being, which herewith is thinking-being, or they rise from the subjective conception of God, which as subjective still lacks reality, to the absolute conception of God, to whom belongs also objective existence. The first of these two paths divides again into two, since it sets out from the world; and the world in its externality has a two-fold deficiency which it seeks to supply: might and light, necessity and freedom.

The world is *many*, God is *all*, Almighty. The world is object, *limited*, dependent, God is the absolute subject, *limiting*, independent, *Wisdom*. In the world being and thought are dirempted; in God they are united, and this union is *Love*. So likewise the three proofs of the divine existence refer to the trinity of God, which from time immemorial has been conceived as Omnipotence, Wisdom and Love.

It cannot fail (to be apparent) that all relations develop in their intention in this triplicity, and that these relations are presented by general categories in successive series.

God is Being, Essence, and Idea. God shows himself first as being in his omnipotence and necessity; as thought in his wisdom and freedom; and lastly as both being *and* thought in his love. First of all however the connection of these three proofs of the divine existence is to be seized.

1. The world, as it exists, is immediate, consequently it is contingent, *i. e.*, it does not have its ground in itself. The truth of the contingent is the *necessary*; this is the immanent ground or the omnipotence of being, the Godhead. As the ground of the world and of every creature is not to be found in the world itself, for even man himself does not have the condition of himself in his own power, so this ground of the world must lie outside of the

world, and hence in God; and the ground of God is God himself, wherewith unconditioned being shows itself as immanent thought. This is the *cosmological proof ex contingentia mundi*.

2. But as the world externally, first of all immediate or accidental, is without beginning, so internally it is mediated, orderly arranged, only that the first self-moving member is wanting. Or, in other words: the world as it is, is created for a purpose. Hence it points to a creator creating for purposes; that is to say, to a rational Author. More definitely it points to an Essence, which not only determines the world but is also self-determining; for otherwise it could not be the highest Essence. Thus the world points back to God. This is the *teleological* or *physico-theological* proof, derived from the constitution of the world. This proof presupposes still more definitely the harmony between the subjective law of thought and the objective law of being, but without proving the presupposition; and this defect of proof is that to which the Critique of Pure Reason is directed. This leads to the third proof.

3. This, according to which the conception of the most perfect being itself implies the objective existence of the same, since without the addition of existence this would not be the most perfect being. I *think*, therefore I *am*; for thinking comprehends in itself being: I, the finite spirit, think the infinite, absolute spirit; and therefore he is as well within me, thinking and thought, as external to me, independent of me. This is the ontological proof, which conversely deduces from the absolute idea the existence of the same, because the former as absolute is here and now, and hence contains being in itself, as conception it comprehends within itself existence.

With these simple statements we may now pause and examine whether in like manner also the proofs for the *immortality of the human soul* can be analyzed, or unfolded and united. The object of this proof is the *soul*, or the finite spirit, more particularly the future of the soul. The inquiry therefore is, first, whether from her present existence and principally whether from her theoretic or objective existence, her indestructibility has been deduced; secondly, whether from her practical or subjective existence, from her inner nature, we may infer the persistence of her inner activity; and thirdly, whether from the conception of the soul, from her own thinking itself, it can be and actually is shown that immortality essentially belongs to the soul.

If the current proofs for the immortality of the human soul in their dogmatic form are not speculative, it nevertheless belongs to philosophy to show their speculative content, for herein alone can lie the systematic statement of these proofs in their necessity. But, in the first place, we may abstract from these proofs, as we find them formulated in the history of philosophy, in order to see whether of themselves they are analogically unfolded out of the proofs for the existence of God. In the next place, it might be considered whether human investigation takes the same course in the psychological sphere which we already see lying before us in the theological sphere.

As the soul somehow exists, she is contingent or immediate; that is she is placed midway without mediation, and so being midway she seeks mediation not alone externally, in order to come to God, but also internally, in order to come to herself. The soul in her immediateness appears as consciousness, that is as being which reflects itself into itself, and, as this being in itself shows itself in its unity. And this unity, a closed circle in itself, is not subject to division and destruction or change, and is hence imperishable.

As the soul is determined, so likewise she feels herself determined by a conscious purpose; more definitely speaking this purpose is self-determination; as an inner nature the soul feels herself at the same time destined for self-determination. As the soul in this points back to a determining being (creator), so also she in herself points to a self-determined inner nature. Herein the soul finds herself in a contradiction. She is destined for self-determination, the development of which is infinite. Self-determination in general belongs to the sphere of the infinite. Hence in this *existing* capacity for self-determination lies the security for the future; the future is wrapped up in the very nature of the soul.

The third argument runs: since namely the conception of eternity, of infinite persistence, dwells in the soul, its reality also dwells there. The soul thinks, which means that she is infinite: she thinks her persistence and cannot think otherwise, consequently reality must also belong to this persistence.

Herewith the desired analogy between the theological and psychological spheres seems to be unexpectedly confirmed, but we must examine this point more closely in order to keep the appearance of arbitrariness at a distance.

1. The first proof for the existence of God was, that the world as contingent and immediate, has its ground and beginning not in itself and not from itself. Therefore the world points to a beginning which lies outside of and above the world, and at the same time is in itself, which is not contingent, not merely immediate, but is mediated in itself, and is therefore necessary. This beginning is thus the absolute inner nature, the inner nature of itself and the inner nature of the world. Through this the world subsists in God, who is her creative inner nature: but the world now seeks her created inner nature: her externality points to her inner nature, as already existing. The inner nature of the world is man; the inner nature of man is the soul. "Is not the germ of nature in the heart of man?" As internality the soul is opposed to the externality of the world. As external the world is multiplicity, changeable, divisible, material; on the contrary, as internal, the soul is oneness, unchangeable, indivisible, and immaterial. In its very nature the outer passes over into other, for the nature of the outer is *otherness*: on the contrary, as the adversary of change, the inner is not dissolved, for its nature is to be *itself*. Hence it transpires that the world which heretofore came to its absolute ground, now also comes to its created ground, that is, to its inner nature, as to its vivifying principle, which as inner is simple, and as simple is indestructible.

2. The thorough-going conformity to a purpose or design of the world, which we perceive as outward, heretofore led with constraining necessity to an absolute and unconditioned principle, determining all things according to its purposes, which we find only in God; but it also at the same time points toward the purpose for which it is determined. As it appears to us, it is first of all the outer world: we have in this a phenomenal manifestation of the divine purpose. As external world its function is to utter this internal purpose: we find this to be the case also actually throughout all spheres of nature and through all intervening circles of these spheres; everywhere there is a struggle to unfold the inner:

Organism consists in this: as the world progresses from step to step, in each cycle, a deeper phase of the internal is attained, but this internal is first fully reached in man. The final goal of the world is the human soul; it is the nature of the soul to be self: the aim and purpose of the soul, as it is defined to be, is self-end. Herein is the soul, as the true end which God has

willed in the creation, the image of God, actual, infinite. The aim to be Self is infinite; since this aim lies in the soul, she is capable of being infinite. The capacity warrants the reality, for otherwise God could not attain his ends.

3. And finally, if we could abstract from the external world still we should find God as independent of his own creation, yet possessed of existence in accordance with the thought of the most perfect being, which we saw could not be perfect if it lacked existence. Thus also, even if we could and would abstract from the existence and constitution of the soul, and from her simplicity and infinite nature, in the conception of persistence we find the reality of persistence warranted, for this thought of persistence, as a feeling, a perception and finally as a conception, actually exists, and so truly exists that its opposite cannot be thought.

With the conception of persistence, consequently the persistence of the soul itself is actual. The soul however is nothing else than self-consciousness: she persists if self-consciousness persists.

In accordance with this it is the human soul or the finite spirit in which the world, according to its immediateness finds mediation and according to its determinateness, its determination. According to its innermost essence, this mediation is indestructible and this determination is infinite. And as the conception of absolute spirit proclaims the existence of God, and reveals the essence of God, so also the conception of finite spirit as spirit is hereby first explained, but also through this the conception of its persistence indwelling in the finite spirit, is given and warranted in its reality.

We have now arrived at that point in the discussion wherein it is meet to present systematically the proofs for the immortality of the human soul or of finite consciousness, as they are recorded and laid down in the pages of the history of philosophy, in order to know them more definitely in their primitive form and definite content, and afterwards to unfold them in especial relation to the proofs for the existence of God.

In the multiplicity of the proofs for the existence of God and for the immortality of man, it results in general that one leads to

the others, and each requires to be carried farther, because it does not suffice by itself. Another characteristic of this plurality of proofs is, that we may think it simultaneously or in succession. In the next place this observation is also confirmed through the *content* of each proof.

But it is also true that each particular proof is intended to be complete by itself. Everybody intends with his proof to complete the demonstration. And this happens because the expression of the proof falls short of the intention of the prover, and because he ascribes to his proof things which he has not really uttered, but are only in his mind, and yet which are necessary to the completion of the proof. That the subject moreover ascribes to its demonstration also what it lacks, is explained by the consideration that this deficiency lies hidden not in the subject alone but also in the proof itself, as the germ of the following undeveloped proof. When however the same proof, which satisfies the prover, proves nothing for another, this arises from the fact that others do not see the complement of the proof either in it as germ, or feel it in themselves, or, at all events, will not recognize what is meant until it is also expressed. This is the first point.

But in this only one side of the demonstration, only the preliminary phases thereof are hinted at. The truth lies not only in the *subject* as its meaning, through which it becomes conviction, but it also lies in the *object* itself: the object has already its truth in itself: therefore the truth of the object itself is forced upon the subject, and the latter is vanquished by the former, and convinced. This is the second point. The third is however the *proof* itself, in which subject and object are united: but they are moreover only externally united, not mutually inter-penetrated: for the third proof, which is to overcome this dualism, is as a proof itself yet an external one.

So much as an introduction to the proofs for immortality, which we shall now proceed to treat in their historical completeness.

1. The soul is *simple*, for the being of the soul is nothing else than *thought*, and thought consists in the unity of the manifold. Through its simplicity it is distinguished from its external body, from all externality, to which extension is attributed, while simplicity consists in intensity. Simplicity is more definitely immateriality, and this is internality. This internality or simplicity is the criterion of the supersensuous or the immaterial, just as ex-

tension is the criterion of the sensuous or the material. As internality, simplicity is more definitely this, to-wit: it moves in and by itself and it is not moved by another.

If now the soul is simple—this is the first premise—it is not subject to any change, neither in space, for it is not extended, it occupies no space, nor in time in successive degrees, for the simple is not a series, but in all time simple. What the soul experiences in the body it experiences not in itself, but its simplicity is unharmed under the temporary load of the body, as long as it is united with it.

From the simplicity of the soul it accordingly follows that it cannot change into another. It cannot get loose from itself, since as a simple it cannot decompose: it must therefore remain what it is. Death is separation, and is therefore the very opposite of the essence of the soul: death cannot touch the soul, since the latter is indissoluble. The motto of death is: divide and conquer. Death reigns only where it can sunder and separate: therefore death has no power over the soul, for it is in itself indissolubly one, therefore immortal, for indissoluble and immortal are one.

Hence in the popular philosophy this simplicity has been characterized negatively as indivisibility, or also as persistency, in which view the soul itself is treated as an external object, which ought not to be done so long as it is simple. On the contrary, speculative philosophy conceives simplicity as internality. Aristotle conceives it as the self-moving essence, and on this account as simple. (*De Anima*, III.—4). But the oldest traces of this psychology are found in Heraclitus, who declares the driest soul to be the ripest, and dates the proper life of the same from the death of the body, for it is the body which keeps the soul from its fellowship with God. According to the testimony of Aristotle, the psychology of Anaxagoras is more definite, for he recognized the soul as well in its simplicity as in its immanent self-movement.

In like manner Cicero seeks to unite both phases of the argument: "Since the nature of the soul is simple, it cannot be dissolved, because, if it cannot be divided it cannot be destroyed." It lies actually already in this simplicity that the soul subsists in itself, "nor has its principle of motion in another, because it moves itself." (*De Senect.* Sect. 78). Consequently the soul has no external principle, "which (as Goethe says) only im-

pinges upon it from without." St. Augustine (De Civit. Dei XI., 10., De Spirit. An., cap. 24). If the soul had another, foreign principle outside of itself, only then would it be dependent, and would therefore be subject to change. But as simple it is in itself and indestructible.

This proof, based on the simplicity of the soul, is also treated by Socrates both in Plato's Phædo and also in the Phædrus, but Plato is careful not to define the soul dogmatically after the manner of a thing imaged in the mind, as a finite existence, but speculatively as the thinking activity itself, through which procedure this proof is lifted into its higher category. First of all however this proof belongs to conception (which thinks in images); according to what this proof declares, it takes the soul as the "thing-in-itself." Wherefore it is named the metaphysical proof; it would be more proper to name it the theoretical proof, since the soul as object is placed over against it, without being one with it: it is therefore *par excellence* dogmatic.

It is well to mark that this proof from the contingent existence of the soul, as it finds itself immediately as simple in time, infers in a consequent manner, its existence out of time, and from death, by which the body through divisibility is subdued, infers immortality which pertains to the soul by reason of its indivisibility. As far as this proof evidently corresponds with the cosmological proof for the existence of God, which from contingent existence infers eternal being, so far it is *par excellence* the psychological proof for immortality.

In the Phædo, Simmias seeks to refute the premise which asserts simplicity as supersensuous, with the example of the lyre; but he is obliged to confess that the harmony which the lyre produces, although it is invisible, is not therefore supersensuous; it is dependent upon the instrument and does not have its principle in itself, while the soul precedes the body as principle of the latter and of itself. (Hegel WW., XIV., 214). Just as little also could Kant confute this time-honored proof with the category of intensive quantity; for this category of degree, according to which the soul is to fade away and vanish, as light, and heat, and sound, applies only to finite, sensuous magnitudes, but not to the simple, hence not to the supersensuous and infinite. (Hegel's Logik, III. 304, and Hegel WW., III., 260, V. 268-9). Kant has therefore actually said no more than Simmias, nor more than Lucretius, who long before him called attention to the diminution of mental

power with the age of the body, and also long before him was refuted by Anti-Lucretius. (Cardinalis Melch. de Polignac: *Opus posthumum*). "Do you then place the divine art of music in the resonant shell? and do you think that the instrument, and he who uses it, the artist, are one and the same? This is the relation that subsists between the spirit and the body." It is not this special instrument, not the external instrument, to which the artist is bound.

The empirical observation, that the soul wanes in the body, and with it, till it finally burns out like a candle, from which La Mettrie, together with all materialists, infers the mortality of the soul—this fact of experience, which also strikes down the most exalted spiritualism, can hence only prove the participation of the soul in the ills of the body during its connection with the body. That is to say: the soul diminishes only outwardly, but it itself is not outward; it itself does not expire, burn out, but this its externalization burns out after it has served its purpose.

Thus the butterfly is imprisoned in the chrysalis, and its wings are folded up until the chrysalis bursts. Plato in the *Phædo* also treats of this confinement and redeliverance. The body is the instrument of the soul, but also its temporary restraint; hence while the body serves the soul it likewise limits it; if the servant becomes weak, the mastery also suffers thereby. With the dissolution of the body the soul becomes free again; now it rouses itself again to lift and move its pinions once more. Wherefore we often see the soul in the most vigorous power when the body dies; often in the last moments of the dying hour we are permitted to see the spirit yet again in all its supremacy and independence. Schubert, (in the *Christoterpe* for the year 1834), has furnished us with two illustrious examples of this kind. They are derived from ancient times, and concern the Emperor of Morocco, Muley Maluk, and the Bishop of Cæsarea, Basil the Great; the last moments of both these men were the most luminous points of their whole busy lives, wherein the might of the spirit unfolded itself in the most glorious and the most independent way. In them we may visibly see what otherwise invisibly transpires in the hour of death.

Nevertheless we must confess that this last highest outbeaming of the soul at the moment of its separation and release from the body which fades and sinks down while the soul mounts up, only evinces its difference from the body and its superiority over

it, but does not therefore of itself prove the immortality of the human soul. Should not this fact also serve this purpose: even while this phenomenon of itself, as a sensuous phenomenon, does not prove immortality, on the other hand it is by this shown that the waning of the soul with the decease of its external organ cannot prove the mortality of the soul. This serves only to refute the refutation of the preceding proof.

As often happens, we have by this descended into the purely sensuous sphere, while we wished to defend the supersensuous essence of the soul. Kant's intensive magnitude, which belongs to this sphere, contains the immediate occasion of this descent; hence it also misses the speculative content of the proof to which it is opposed, and is directed only against the dogmatic form of the same. In regard to the substance of the proof itself it stands in much the same relation to Kant's refutation as exists in the case of Kant's procedure against the ontological proof for the existence of God, which Kant meant to invalidate but really has not invalidated by the renowned example of the \$100, the thought of which is not equivalent to the possession of the same, and which may be thought just as well on the debit side of the ledger as on the credit side. For the assumed discrimination of the conception of a thing from its existence, which he pictured in the sum of \$100, is valid only of the finite, sensuous thing, or generally of things, while in fact the difference of the finite as opposed to the actual, infinite or absolute, consists precisely in this discrepancy between the conception and its reality.

If the soul is truly simple, it is also as little exposed to a gradual diminishing as to division: it is no mere "thing," it is internality, and as internal is not subject to the sensuous conception of a separation of the inner from the outer, but the internal has the external in and by itself.

So much for the first, for the so-called metaphysical proof for the immortality of the human soul, which is the rational, and as rational, is simple. The Critique of Pure Reason has shattered or rather annulled this proof only in respect to its dogmatic form, according to which the soul is treated as thing. And this is the immortal service of the critical philosophy, to have overthrown the dogmatic form of modern philosophy, and herewith again to have paved the way for the speculative comprehension.

2. But further, the soul, as it is, is constituted and destined for ends, which being infinite can never be attained here nor in time.

Consequently there belongs to the essential nature of the soul, eternal persistence which can alone adequately respond to its wants. In its infinite destiny by which it is also a determining First Cause, infinite persistence is as surely appointed to it, as that God himself is eternal and cannot contradict himself. "Life is short, but art is long."

Here belongs also the notion of the education of mankind, which rests upon the infinite capacity of the development of finite spirit, and has been more definitely demonstrated by Lessing. For the spirit of man neither the present nor any other time is sufficient, but only the fullness of time, the actual infinity, in which the soul alone finds satisfaction and sufficiency.

It is well to observe that the destiny of the inner man, if it is also thought as complete, can be complete only in so far as the soul attains the infinite, in which its destiny subsists. But the soul would moreover not yet have attained the infinite as its end, if it should again cease its possession of it, if it does not retain the goal for which it was destined.

Therefore that is also only a species of this proof, in which it among other things is applied to moral compensation, to the recompense of good and evil according to the principle of justice. In so far God is presupposed as absolute justice.

Here belongs the proof derived from consciousness, as the immediate expression of the soul,—a proof which Kant included under the form of a postulate, because he would not acknowledge it except as demanded by consciousness, and he found the subjectivity of this demand necessary to be constantly put forward for the avoidance of all self-deception. It is well worthy of remark how in accordance with this, Kant, in the midst of his opposition to dogmatism, against which he fortified himself step by step, remained involved in the dogmatic mode of apprehension; for he still regarded the soul as a thing, as the "thing-in-itself," to which the designation of "subject" could not be attributed as an objective quality, while yet to the soul, nothing can be more appropriate than to be subject, self-consciousness, or, in a practical relation, conscience.

But leaving this out of view, this is the proof which Kant has admitted in another form. J. G. Fichte also confesses: "Man must have an end transcending this life." Fichte finds this end in the will; but the Ego of this will seems destined to go down before the moral order of the world.

This very proof is also otherwise more used than any other in the various applications. Upon the ethico-religious basis of this proof rests also the simple protestation, in which the self-consciousness utters itself, and which no one can entirely deny: "However low and mean I am," so at least now and then every one feels, "yet there is something godlike, immortal and imperishable in me, in my Ego, namely the Ego itself." So the soul in its innermost being affirms: herein, in immediate feeling, it expresses the presence of its futurity: in its existing imperishableness, it feels its futurity.

First of all moreover the proof in its dogmatic statement is directed to the future, as the world to come, which as yet does not exist: it infers this from the capacity of the soul for it, and from the constitution and destination of the soul.

Cicero says that the soul is directed more to the future than to the present. That the soul goes to the future, lies already imbedded in the concept of all activity, and in the concept of self-activity, which accompanies the self. "He plants trees which profit another generation; why does he look to this future generation, if after generations do not pertain to him?" (*Tusc. disp.* I., 14).

The death of children, the dying of youth in the midst of their first unfolding, the setting amid the rising, the breaking down of the strongest activity in the midst of the course, has also helped to strengthen this proof. In Plato's *Phædo*, (Sect. 72 to 78), in a seemingly opposite direction, Socrates arrives at the same proof, in which pre-existence is inferred from the circumstance of learning, which is nothing but reminiscence, and from pre-existence is inferred post-existence, or the future destiny of the soul. Pre-existence is itself nothing else than the presupposition of a design, for which the soul, i. e., the internal, exists, i. e., it is external and persists internally. These ends, for which the soul exists, require in themselves the past in their origin or motive, just as well as they require the present for their completion in the future; just as everything which is determined presupposes a whence as a determining, and a whither, as an aim or limit. Hence reminiscence is nothing else than the energy with which the individual soul becomes that for itself which it actually (*actu*) is in itself, and must have been potentially before. (*Hegel WW.*, XIV., 203-213).

Upon this jointly depends the idea of creation in general, and

the relation of creation to an actual creator. Since God is apprehended as the unconditioned infinite being, hence as the absolute spirit, creation also, as the work of infinite spirit, is infinite, i. e., spirit, i. e., it is conditioned in its origin, infinite in its becoming, but finite in its being, or in a word it is the finite spirit, i. e., an infinite striving after God. God is infinite being, the created spirit is an infinite becoming: God is absolute spirit; man is finite spirit. In this finitude, which dwells in the created infinity as its limit, is also explained the idea of matter, as the outer, herewith the multiplicity of creation is set over against the unity of God, as well as in the becoming of the organism within its limits evermore transfigured in accordance with its principle. And upon this is grounded the so-called physiological proof of immortality so much sought for, before and after Sulzer, which admits that there is in the soul a truly fixed but essentially pertaining self-progressive form of finitude or limitation, and from this limit in its continual assimilation and penetration, inference is made of the infinite capacity of the soul for development. The human soul contains this proof *in adjecto* in its predicate.

Above all, it is the inner, higher improvement, the perfectibility, to which this proof points. Thence also is explained the higher elevation of the soul, by which betimes in the moment of death it exults over the future. In Plato's *Phædo* there is especially an allusion made to the beautiful simile of the swan, which before death sings its most charming and lovely song, not perhaps out of fear in the presence of death, as mankind are wont to think, but with an ardent longing after eternal life, with a presentiment of the higher good itself, and in the joy of now departing and coming to God, of now attaining its proper end, its true life element.

It is ever the same proof which we have traced under its manifold metamorphoses: it is known under the name of moral or practical, and has been popular especially since the time of Spalding, Jerusalem, Mendelssohn, Kaestner, Kampe, Jacob, and Sinteniz. In so far as this proof goes over from the adaptation of the soul to its attainment, it is teleological; it corresponds to the teleological proof for the existence of God. And as this last is also apprehended as physico-theological, so also the moral proof has been apprehended as theological not only in its relation to God, but also as physiological in the organic progression of the finite spirit and its analogy to the natural organism, and it

might be termed anthropological. In the ultimate analysis this proof rests upon the idea of creation, hence upon the presupposition of God as the creator, just as all conscious teleology presupposes the theological principle, the consciousness of absolute personality. Hence also the purposes, which we read in the human soul and which we know as the bases of this proof, have likewise been seized as the purposes of God, which are met in his works and follow from the same.

Herewith the concrete forms of this soul-proof change only the more: until the present time they have run together in a confused manifoldness. But if we now inquire more particularly we shall have in the moral proof as heretofore in the metaphysical proof, essentially but two steps to distinguish. In its dogmatic statement the proof is primarily based upon the future, as upon the beyond which as yet is not; there lies an infinity of purpose at the basis of it, which never can be attained, since infinity itself is not yet mediated in itself. The truth of this view however consists in this, that the future is found in the progressive present and is discerned as already existing, whence also infinity no longer consists in this, that the end can never be completely attained, but much more in this, that the soul cannot cease attaining it, while a finite end, if it is attained, ceases, hence also limit and end are demanded reciprocally by speech.

In relation to the metaphysical or theoretical proof, the moral or practical is pre-eminently the higher step: it lies already in the naming, that the former begins to consider the soul as object, the latter on the contrary as subject; in the former the soul is first of all seized as thing, in the latter as activity; in the theoretical proof immortality consists in this, that the soul first of all as simple remains unchanged, what it is, while in the moral proof it does not remain stationary but progresses without losing its identity. And if in the next place, in the higher apprehension of the first proof, since it rests upon the simplicity of the soul, it has self-consciousness of the same as its essence for its basis, so now also the second proof in its statement, since it rests upon the infinite destiny of the soul, recognizes the consciousness of God, which dwells in the soul as the higher principle. Upon this height Anselm seized the religious-moral proof. (*Monolog.*, C. 66-72). For since the soul, for itself mortal, comes through thinking into a conscious relation to God, as eternal personality, its finite individuality is also secured from perishing.

It has found its principle in which it cannot perish. The finger of God has touched it, and thus it subsists in the Eternal. Verily a saying runs through time that the finite creature, if it sees God, must die; but the truth is, that only its mere finitude perishes. Only that which is finite in the soul perishes. To this is attached that higher truth, according to which the intuition of eternal Godhead invests him who intuits with immortality. Well does the Psyche shrink and quake before the aspect of God, with whom she has been connected hitherto, though invisible.

This first glimpse of comprehension brings it into fearful necessity and labor in the service of an angry goddess; but it is love which is angry, and the end is that in a broader consequence that intuition of the supreme God is invested with immortality. Immortality is deification (*Goettlichkeit*). First through this inward repletion with God the abstract infinity of persistence rises to the concrete infinity of the presence.

Hence it appears clearer and clearer how it is that the moral proof as well as the physiological and physico-theological proofs depend upon the consciousness of God, in which the soul truly subsists. According to the metaphysical proof the soul is through its moral nature, and through the will of God which we read in the soul, already sheltered from death.

According to the first proof God could, if he would, still destroy the soul, (so has one actually expressed it); according to the second proof, God will not do it—God's will is expressed in the soul and the will of God is indestructible. In the *Timæus*, as well as in other relations, Plato teaches the same.

The most perfect work in the creation of God, unfolding successively all the moments of being and thought, is the image of God, the creator. The image of God is the created God, which, elevated above all other works of creation, in this cannot perish, and cannot be overcome and annihilated by any other being, except alone the being which is over him, namely, by God. God could do it, but he will not, because it is a contradiction to the most perfect creator to destroy his most perfect creation.

But before we proceed further, in order to find the essential transition, we must more definitely examine the two previously named proofs, in the process underlying them as a ground. It is therefore to be kept in mind that all proof, according to the relation of being and thought, in which it moves, points to a double mode of finding the transition from one to the other. For in-

stance, it either proceeds from a given existence and infers from its quality or constitution its necessary sequence, which has no sensuous existence but is based only upon the necessity of thinking, and must actually be; or it proceeds *vice versa* from the subjective concept of persistence with which it formerly concluded, as its point of beginning, and infers in the next place from its necessity to its reality. Both these proofs, which have been hitherto considered, belong to the first way; for they proceed from the position that the soul exists, and draw inferences from its nature. The soul exists; according to its essence it is composed of self-consciousness or of thought; as thinking, the soul, according to its objective side, is simple, hence indestructible; according to its subjective side or according to its intensive fullness, it has an infinite destiny, and participates in infinity. Thought as quality, is therefore attributed to the soul, and in its result on the one side, is simplicity; from which it follows that the soul cannot be changed; on the other side is the intensive capacity for infinity, from which it follows that the soul must persist. In both cases the transition is made from the what and how of its existence, to its complete ideal, to what belongs to its totality. Besides this there remains yet the other mode of proof, which introduces the third sphere of the psychological process.

The idea of persistence, inasmuch as it is necessary, leads only logically to reality itself. Ratiocination is itself nothing else than the constraining power which dwells in the inner necessity of the idea. The idea of persistence is moreover necessary, because its opposite cannot be thought, because the entire extermination of the determinations of being is simply incompatible with thought.

That the negation of persistence is unthinkable, has this ground and purpose, that the cancelling in which it is posited, instantly annuls itself, for it is the very essence of negation that it negates itself, whereby the negated being is again restored. As being belongs to being, so being belongs also to thought. Upon this negation of negation hence rests the proof of the idea of persistence in its further unfolding and higher statement.

It now becomes necessary that we pursue more definitely the concreter statements of this to the illustrating of this third proof.

From the idea of persistence follows its actuality, for the soul as spirit is this idea itself. The soul thinks persistence, and

should it not have it? Can thinking thought be and yet be without being? Vice versa, it cannot think annihilation, and nothing is more foreign to the soul, nothing is more out of harmony with thought than nothing, pure nothing, nothing as nothing; and is this unthinkable nothing to be the destiny and the outcome of thought? or is thought, which is one with the soul, to become the thought of another, the thought which rests upon self-consciousness, to be without self-consciousness?

We cannot think that anywhere a particle of dust in the material world perishes: how much less can a soul perish in the world of spirit?

Everything endures, so teaches the concept with constraining necessity. Everything remains what it is, uninjured notwithstanding its further perfection and transformation. Dust remains dust, what is divisible remains divisible, i. e., indifferent to its other being, indifferent to its dissolution; and yet the soul is not to remain what it is, spirit is not to remain spirit, i. e., be self-consciousness, indivisible, contradicting its dissolution?

For the material, its other being is no disadvantage, hence it also suffers no damage, no destruction, in its transition into other: for the spirit, there is on the contrary annihilation in the destruction of its self-hood, which it cannot of course suffer, since it cannot endure annihilation.

The wave remains what it is, although it sinks away into the sea; the wave is afterwards as before selfless. And is not the self to remain what it is, namely, self?

Persistence is necessary, since in thinking itself, as the innermost oneness of being, it is indestructible. Non-being hence is as incompatible with thought as with being. Since I am, I cannot also not be. Upon this truth also Sterne's oft repeated apostrophe to death is wrecked, but it is also ingenious and suggestive: "I would be a fool to fear thee, O death," says the Ego, "for so long as I am, thou art not, and if thou art, I am not."

In this alternative it is presupposed that death could be; but this presupposition is instantly annulled, for death consists precisely in non-being, so that death itself is not.

But to death its non-being is scarcely methodically shown, since it nevertheless comes, as if nothing had happened to it, and laughs at the artificial proof, which is to kill death itself, and seizes him who had hitherto disputed him away, so much the more chillingly with his ice-cold hands.

Hence death announces itself to the senses as the negation of life. Now follows however also likewise from this negation the further negation which death has in itself; and this further negation, the negation of death, is the renewal of life, the new life, which now verifies itself as imperishable, for it arises from the absolute negation with which death is overcome. This is the negation which according to its own essence inflicts upon itself what it has in itself. The conception, and with the conception the reality of persistence depends upon this. The first ground in Plato's *Phædo* which Socrates renders prominent for proving immortality, in the course of his conversation shortly before his own death, also depends upon this. Everything originates from its contrary and from what it is not. From the negation of life proceeds the opposite of this negation. As death arises from life, so life again comes from death. *Contraria fiunt e contrariis*. Life affirms itself; death negates itself. Death moreover affirms life, since death negates itself. It transforms the *nay* of death into the *yea* of life.

This proof also draws support from language: we express it unconsciously. In the first place language itself cannot forbear ascribing to the past an essential being. Language also shows itself in this respect as the utterance of spirit, which thinks for us, and before we are conscious of it. From this circumstance are explained the many attempts to develop, in a methodical manner out of language, thought and the entire content of philosophy, or truth in the system of its particular elements.

The expressive emblem in the sphere of this proof is the *Phœnix*, which from its own ashes rises again. So we read especially in the Christian Platonic Dialogue which *Æneas of Gaza* wrote on the subject of immortality. The bird *Phoenix* is said to live five hundred years, and then dying and wholly decaying it returns to life.

Moreover the name of the proof is self-evident: it is in its essence the logical, more definitely the ontological, because it vindicates to the logical its reality. Likewise it is clear that it corresponds to the ontological proof for the existence of God, since from the necessary conception of persistence is deduced its reality, from the concept of negation, which is death, the negation of this negation is deduced, or from the contrary of persistence, the contrary of the contrary is deduced, from nothing to the nothing of death, to the nothing which is not, in unceasing progress.

It remains that we pursue further the conception of persistence, in order to learn how this third proof unites in itself the two preceding proofs, since these proofs become in it transparent toward each other. The persistence or the imperishableness, from the conception of which the third proof proceeds, is in respect to the soul, of which it is predicated, or to which it is transferred, to be apprehended as the persistence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness however was the foundation of the first proof, to which the conception of persistence as self-consciousness developed itself in its necessity. The necessity of persistence has its ground in the very essence of self-consciousness, which at first was apprehended as simple, and now has become adequate to the ideal.

The persistence of self-consciousness is in the next place further defined in relation to God as personal imperishableness. The conception of personal imperishableness accordingly has its deepest ground in the conception of absolute personality, which, as the consciousness of God indwelling in the soul was the foundation of the second proof for immortality, and through this the conception of a personal persistence gets its final substantiation, its irrefutable necessity. Hence the conception of personal imperishableness is necessary, since the conception of absolute personality is necessary. Man cannot fail of personal imperishableness, since he cannot free himself from absolute eternity, from God. In the sphere of the third proof, both these sides, which shape first both spheres of proof, are united and concentrated. The concrete conception of persistence mediates the double relation of the soul to itself and to God. Hence in the first place the ontological proof for the personal persistence of the soul comes forth in its deepest signification, as in its innermost relation to the theological sphere, particularly to the ontological proof for the existence of God. This last proof shows itself identical with the first. It vindicates the conception of an eternal essence, and in the next place in relation to the finite spirit, the idea of imperishableness, and the reality of personal imperishableness.

In proving the necessity of imperishableness, personal imperishableness for self-consciousness is also proved as necessary, for there is no other imperishableness for self-consciousness than the personal. The ontological proof, which belongs to the theological province, comes generally first through its relation to the

finite spirit, hence in the psychological sphere, to its complete content. The meaning is this: the finite spirit which thinks God, and ascribes to this thought of God in its essential content, the necessary reality belonging to it, finds itself by means of this thought in a thinking, i. e., a self-conscious relation to the eternal essence, whose reality is hereby warranted. The reality of this relation to the eternal essence of God consists moreover essentially in the imperishableness of the self-conscious knowledge of God, upon which the ontological proof for personal immortality, since it harmonizes both the foregoing proofs, rests in its last analysis. Personal immortality is to be verbally translated as self-conscious knowledge of God in the finite spirit. The ontological proof, as its name would indicate, proceeds from thinking, to which it attributes being. Thought is: hence moreover its existence is thereby expressed. Its actuality consists, according to its essence, in the infinity reflected into itself. This is the first. The second is that thinking itself relates just as well to God.

Since in this his self-consciousness widens into God-consciousness, it presupposes the inner union with its object upon which the third proof rests. Thinking consists essentially in this inner union, through which it is purified as well as preserved. Hence Marsilius Ficinus says: "The human soul is immortal, because it cleaves to the divine." And Cardan confesses: "I have known the immortality of the human soul not now first but always, for I feel sometimes that the intellect is so possessed of God, that we see that we are again one with him." As often as we feel or perceive our innermost soul in its sensual relation to God and to itself, just so often do we feel or perceive also its imperishableness.
